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BOOK REVIEWS

of Defence, dealing with issues at the
strategic level, exposed him to the illdefined world of negotiation and compromise and to the requirement to balance
the myriad of interests between politics,
the defence industry, the research lobby,
academia, and the military itself. Here,
Hill’s greater depth and increased granularity of analysis provide a far better insight to the man, who wrestled with the
introduction of Trident as Britain’s strategic deterrent, and with the reorganization of the highest levels of defence to
establish the primacy of the Chief of the
Defence Staff over the service chiefs.
Lewin’s open mind, calm and modern
style of leadership, and determination to
deliver a viable and flexible defence for
the United Kingdom of 2020 made him
unique amongst his peers and still marks
him out as an inspiration for all today.
His vision of the establishment of a genuinely joint-service culture and of a balanced fleet that is fully interoperable with
the Army and Royal Air Force and has a
global reach, with a resulting capability
to act as a force for good on the international stage, still exists today and continues to be refined in an uncertain world.
With the Quadrennial Defense Review in
progress, the latter half of the biography
will especially appeal to most of this journal’s readership. It will be of real value to
Naval War College students only a few
years removed from their first assignment to the Department of Defense in
Washington. Having gone myself straight
from frigate command and the U.S. Naval War College to the Ministry of Defence for the first time—to face the
Strategic Defence Review (our QDR)—I
would have found Hill’s insight into
Lewin’s match-winning formula an extremely useful preparation. Notwithstanding the time lapse and slight cultural
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differences, the frenetic activity and the
importance of networking skills and integrity are the same in the Ministry of
Defence and the Department of Defense,
and the wheels of progress still move
quite slowly in both London and
Washington.
TONY JOHNSTONE-BURT, OBE

Commodore, Royal Navy
Britannia Royal Naval College

Sandars, C. T. America’s Overseas Garrisons: The
Leasehold Empire. New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
2000. 345pp. $65

Christopher Sandars, a career civil servant
at the British Ministry of Defence, has
written a concise and judicious account,
based on published sources, of the
unique global security system developed
by the United States in the years after
World War II. Convinced that this American system was neither a traditional empire nor an attempt to gain worldwide
hegemony, he describes it as a “leasehold
empire,” a novel security system necessitated by America’s anticolonial tradition
and by the surge of postwar nationalism,
in which the United States negotiated a
series of base agreements with largely
sovereign states. His study traces the development of this system and the enormous variety within it, ranging from
colonial relationships with Guam, Hawaii,
Panama, and the Philippines to basing
rights by virtue of conquest in Germany,
Italy, Japan, and South Korea, to the revival of wartime arrangements in Great
Britain, and to the acquisition of heavily
circumscribed rights in some Middle
Eastern nations.
In dealing with these categories, Sandars
provides a brief history of America’s

1

Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 4, Art. 22
178

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

political relationship with each nation, a
detailed account of the bases acquired, a
shrewd analysis of the various quarrels
that emerged, and a careful description
of the changes that occurred over the
fifty years covered by this book. With
some nations, such as Japan, the security
relationship displayed a remarkable continuity, while in others, such as Panama
and the Philippines, growing nationalist
tensions forced the United States eventually to close its bases. America’s relationships with Greece, Spain, and Turkey,
new allies in the Mediterranean, were always filled with difficulties, while the
United States was never able to obtain
access to permanent bases in the Middle
East. In this area of the world it had to
rely on mobile forces and the
prepositioning of military equipment.
By the mid-1980s America’s leasehold
empire was under serious strain, beset by
nationalist pressures and by what some
scholars described as imperial overreach.
Sandars believes that critics like Paul
Kennedy overemphasized the gap between American resources and obligations, and failed to anticipate the end of
the Cold War, the revival of the American economy in the 1990s, and the agility
with which the United States adjusted to
the new international environment and
redefined its informal empire. Between
1989 and 1995 the number of U.S. troops
permanently based overseas fell over 50
percent, from 510,000 to 238,000.
Sandars speculates that America’s leasehold empire will last, on a reduced scale,
far into the new century. “After a long
period of mismatch,” he writes, “the demands of the U.S. global security system
and the resources to sustain it are now
back in equilibrium.” He is convinced
that the benefits of this worldwide system
of military bases far outweigh the costs,
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and he praises the accomplishments of
American foreign policy in the second
half of the twentieth century. The United
States, he concludes, “has emerged with
credit and honor from this unique experiment of policing the world, not by imposing garrisons on occupied territory,
but by agreement with her friends and
allies.”
CHARLES E. NEU

Brown University

Sarantakes, Nicholas Evan. Keystone: The American
Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations.
College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2000.
264pp. $34.95

In the after-action report on the U.S. occupation of the Rhineland following
World War I, Colonel I. L. Hunt wrote,
“The history of the United States offers
an uninterrupted series of wars, which
demanded as their aftermath, the exercise
by its officers of civil government functions.” “Despite the[se] precedents,” he
lamented, “the lesson seemingly has not
been learned.” The military returned to
this tradition of forgetting after World
War II. Subsequent to that second global
conflict, U.S. forces assumed responsibility for over two hundred million people
in occupation zones in Asia and Europe
at a cost of over a billion dollars a year,
yet official military histories barely touch
the topic. Texas A&M University professor
Nicholas Evan Sarantakes steps in to fill
part of the void with a thought-provoking
case study of the American occupation of
Okinawa from 1945 to the island’s formal return to Japanese sovereignty in
1972. Sarantakes’s thesis is that bureaucratic infighting shaped the course of the
occupation as much as did national
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